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Rationalism in Public Law 
Graham Gee* and Grégoire Webber** 
 (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 708 
 
Abstract 
Rationalism is ‘the stylistic criterion of all respectable politics’. So lamented political 
philosopher Michael Oakeshott in a series of essays published in the 1940s and 
1950s. Rationalism, for Oakeshott, is shorthand for a propensity to prioritise the 
universal over the local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, principle 
over practice. It culminates in the triumph of abstract principles over practical 
knowledge in a manner that erodes our ability to engage in political activity. 
Although Oakeshott’s critique was made with the practice and study of politics in 
mind, it has a wider relevance. For rationalism, as we see it, has become the 
dominant style in public law. We draw upon Oakeshott’s critique to elucidate the 
risks associated with rationalism in public law and call for a renewed engagement 
with practical knowledge in the study of the constitution. 
Key words: Public Law, Rationalism, Oakeshott, Traditions, Technical Knowledge and 
Practical Knowledge 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For public lawyers, ours is an age of principle. This is most obvious in the attempt 
of many public lawyers to ground the British constitution on a set of fundamental 
and rationally justified principles, such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, 
and judicial independence. Today, the methodology of many public lawyers seems 
to involve expounding the meaning and content of a set of principles, evaluating 
prevailing practices in terms of those principles, and if necessary calling for the re-
fashioning of practice around principle. The result is a push within the study of 
public law for a more rationalised, formalised, and institutionalised constitution. 
This search for principle could be read as evidence of the increasing sophistication 
and surefootedness of public lawyers; a reflection, in other words, of the maturing 
of public law as an academic pursuit, with public lawyers grappling with some of 
the longstanding shortcomings of a constitution renowned for a pragmatism born 
of a deep-seated anti-rationalism. It could also be read, however, as a reflection of 
a rationalistic propensity among public lawyers to prioritise the universal over the 
local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, principle over practice. This 
rationalistic propensity, it could be argued, culminates in public lawyers losing the 
ability to differentiate between the frailty of the constitution and the frailty of their 
own understanding of it.1 We surmise that there is truth to both of these readings. 
Our present aim is to interrogate the rationalistic tendency discernible within the 
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1 See F. Mount, The British Constitution Now (London: Heinemann, 1992) 32. 
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search for principle in public law; that is to say, to explore what might be termed 
rationalism in public law.  
To explore the phenomenon of rationalism in public law, we draw upon the work 
of Michael Oakeshott.2 Public lawyers have grown accustomed to canvassing the 
works of political philosophers to cast light on the nature of public law, but they 
have largely neglected Oakeshott’s oeuvre. We suspect that there are three main 
and partially overlapping reasons for this. First, Oakeshott’s style is idiosyncratic 
and something of an acquired taste.3 His prose is, for a start, distinctively 
‘English’. It is peppered with homely—critics would say homespun—metaphors 
drawn from the worlds of cricket, cookery, and Victorian England; metaphors 
that are unlikely to be to everyone’s taste.4 More significantly, Oakeshott defies 
several scholarly conventions. There is little refutation of the arguments of other 
political philosophers in his writings and few and far between are the logical 
puzzles and linguistic analyses emblematic of much contemporary political 
philosophy.5 One consequence of this is that readers can sometimes struggle to 
situate Oakeshott’s claims within the landscape of political philosophy, let alone to 
extrapolate to other disciplines, such as public law.6 A further consequence is that 
the subtlety of his thought is not easily understood without a close examination of 
some of his individual essays, for he rarely enumerates his main claims, preferring 
to allow themes to flow uninterrupted into each other as if mirroring the cadence 
of a conversation. As one commentator puts it, Oakeshott’s essays ‘are like a 
palimpsest insofar as they seem to contain multiple layers in which many 
intriguing things are visible in fleeting and tantalizing glimpses’.7 
A second reason for the relative neglect of Oakeshott’s work by public lawyers is 
the commonplace characterisation of his thought as ‘conservative’. We suspect 
that this leads some public lawyers to assume either that Oakeshott’s writings are 
of interest only to those sharing this disposition or that all of his writings pursue a 
right-leaning agenda. Neither assumption holds true. For a start, Oakeshott is not 
so easily categorised and, indeed, he eschews labels such as conservative or liberal 
                                                 
2 Useful introductions to the political philosophy of Michael Oakeshott include W.H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott’s 
Philosophical Politics (London: Longmans, 1966); P. Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and T. Nardin, The Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). 
3 See generally J.L. Auspitz, ‘Michael Joseph Oakeshott (1901-1990)’ in J. Norman (ed), The Achievement of 
Michael Oakeshott (London: Duckworth, 1993) 1, 9-10. 
4 See J. Horton, ‘A Qualified Defence of Oakeshott’s Politics of Scepticism’ (2005) 4 European Journal of 
Political Theory 23, 24. 
5 Though seldom explicitly engaging with other writers in his principal works, Oakeshott did so relentlessly 
throughout his career via book reviews, publishing more than 160 reviews across almost 70 years, in both 
academic and non-academic publications. His book reviews for the period 1926-1951 are now consolidated 
in M. Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926-51 (ed. L. O’Sullivan, 
Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009). 
6 It has been suggested that a further consequence of this unique style is that, even within the realm of 
political philosophy, Oakeshott’s work ‘could never become the basis for a school or movement of any 
kind’: N. O’Sullivan, ‘In the Perspective of Western Thought’ in J. Norman (ed), The Achievement of Michael 
Oakeshott (London: Duckworth, 1993) 101, 101. See also P. Kelly, ‘The Oakeshottians’ in M. Flinders, A. 
Gamble, C. Hay, and M. Kenny (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of British Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 154. 
7 D. Candrera, ‘Oakeshott and Plato: A Philosophical Conversation’ in T. Fuller and C. Abel (eds), The 
Intellectual Legacy of Michael Oakeshott (Exeter: Imprint, 2005) 2, 3. 
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in most of his published works.8 Though he is regularly labelled conservative, 
there are some who have characterised parts of his work as expounding a kind of 
liberalism as much as a kind of conservatism;9 others have split the difference, 
suggesting that his is ‘a kind of conservative liberalism or liberal conservatism’.10 
In a similar vein, Oakeshott’s concern is rarely to justify any particular agenda, 
with some of his critiques applying as much to the political right as to the political 
left. His thought, in other words, is not doctrinaire. There is instead a richness and 
complexity to Oakeshott’s essays that make them an important resource for public 
lawyers, no matter our disposition or his. 
Third, to the extent that public lawyers are familiar with Oakeshott’s writings, it is 
primarily through the work of Martin Loughlin.11 Public lawyers owe a large debt 
to Loughlin for advertising the richness and relevance of Oakeshott’s writing. We 
acknowledge our special debt to Loughlin whose scholarship has long insisted on 
the growing rationalistic tendency in public law, drawing—as do we—on 
Oakeshott to substantiate his evaluation. What is unfortunate, in our view, is that 
public lawyers are likely most familiar with the connections that Loughlin mapped 
between Oakeshott, Dicey, and ‘conservative normativism’.12 Not only do these 
connections reinforce the impression that Oakeshott’s political thought is relevant 
only to the extent that it casts light on a conservative disposition within public law 
scholarship, it also affiliates Oakeshott with ‘the impediments of Professor Dicey’s 
England’;13 the very impediments that many public lawyers strive to upend.14 We 
will return to the use that Loughlin makes of Oakeshott’s work, noting some of 
the ways in which we both build on and depart from it.  
                                                 
8 Oakeshott explains that ‘being conservative’ is a ‘disposition’ not a ‘doctrine’: ‘To be conservative, then, is 
to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the 
possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the 
convenient to the perfect, present laughter to Utopian bliss’: ‘On Being Conservative’ in Rationalism in 
Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991) 407, 408-409. 
9 See e.g. P. Franco, ‘Michael Oakeshott as a Liberal Theorist’ (1990) 18 Political Theory 411; and W.J. Coats,  
‘Michael Oakeshott as Liberal Theorist’ (1985) 18 Canadian Journal of Political Science 773. 
10 R. Grant, Oakeshott (London: Claridge, 1990) 62. See further M. Cranston, ‘Michael Oakeshott’s Politics’ 
(1967) 28 Encounter 82 (describing, at 82, Oakeshott as ‘a traditionalist with few traditional beliefs, an 
“idealist”: who is more sceptical than many positivists, a lover of liberty who repudiates liberalism, an 
individualist who prefers Hegel to Locke, a philosopher who disapproves of philosophisme, a romantic 
perhaps ... and a marvellous stylist. Oakeshott’s voice is unique’). 
11 See e.g. Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 64-83 and Legality and Locality: The 
Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 369-378. See also the many 
references to Oakeshott’s work in The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003) and Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010).  
12 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, ibid, 184-190. For Loughlin, ‘conservative normativism’ has been 
the dominant tradition within public law thought, and is underpinned by Dicey’s scholarship. It is 
associated with ‘such ideas as sovereignty, the universal rule of law, and a conception of the rule of law 
which places the judiciary beyond reproach’ (at 232).  
13 J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, 5. 
14 It is worth noting that Oakeshott’s influence on public law thought, such as it is, can be traced not only 
in ‘conservative normativism’. There are also hints in ‘liberal normativism’, insofar as Oakeshott influenced 
Lon Fuller, who in turn influenced a number of prominent ‘liberal normativists’, including Ronald 
Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan, and David Dyzenhaus. On Oakeshott’s influence on Fuller, see J.W.F. Allison, 
‘Legal Culture in Fuller’s Analysis of Adjudication’ in W.J. Witteveen & W. van der Burg (eds.), Rediscovering 
Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999) 346, 
358-363. 
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To make our argument that the search for principle within public law expresses a 
rationalistic propensity, we focus primarily on two of Oakeshott’s most celebrated 
essays. The first is ‘Rationalism in Politics’, originally published in 1947, and in 
which Oakeshott maps the contours of an intellectual propensity that he calls 
‘rationalism’.15 This propensity, Oakeshott explains, can be discerned in most 
human activities, but it has an especially pernicious effect on politics. In this first 
essay, Oakeshott does not offer a comprehensive critique of rationalism, nor does 
he elaborate its pernicious effects on political life. Rather, his readers are offered a 
foretaste of concerns developed in a subsequent essay, ‘Political Education’.16 
Oakeshott delivered this second essay as his inaugural lecture at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science in 1951, where he had succeeded to 
the chair in political science previously occupied by Harold Laski. For reasons that 
will become apparent, Oakeshott’s inaugural lecture caused quite a stir at the LSE, 
and not least because he had assumed Laski’s chair.17 In this second essay, 
Oakeshott considers the consequences of rationalism on political life and presents 
a biting critique of the ‘ideological’ style of politics he associates with it. In neither 
essay does Oakeshott purport to engage explicitly with questions of law or the 
legal system.18 The special burden of our paper is to offer a close reading of these 
two essays that illuminates their potential for revealing something significant 
about the study of public law in Britain.19  
 
If the primary objective of our paper is, then, to take issue with the rationalistic 
tendency within the search for principle in public law, a secondary objective is to 
show how a close reading of Oakeshott’s work can be a rich resource for public 
lawyers. We begin by considering in some detail Oakeshott’s critique of 
rationalism and its effects on the practice and study of politics. Next, we explain 
why this critique of rationalism in politics can help us to identify and make sense 
of a similar propensity within public law. We identify a number of ‘sites’ where 
rationalism in public law is especially manifest and seek to show how each distorts 
                                                 
15 ‘Rationalism in Politics’ in Rationalism in Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991) 5. This 
essay was first published in the Cambridge Journal and later included in a collection of essays entitled 
Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (1962). The Liberty Fund reprinted this collection in 1991, adding a 
further six essays not included in the original collection. 
16 ‘Political Education’ in Rationalism in Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991) 43. 
17 The difference between the scholarship of Oakeshott and Laski was stark. As Ralf Dahrendorf notes, 
‘Oakeshott was conversational, where Laski was forever the great orator; he was concerned with details 
where Laski preferred the great sweep; he dug deeply into the past … where Laski could never get enough 
of the present, the day, almost the minute; and, of course, Oakeshott was a true and profound conservative 
thinker’: R. Dahrendorf, LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science (Oxford: OUP, 
1995) 368. 
18 Oakeshott’s most obviously legal-oriented writings are to be found in his ‘The Rule Law’ [1983] in M. 
Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays (ed. T. Fuller, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999) 119, to which could 
be added his ‘Introduction to Leviathan’ in M. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1975) 1 and ‘The New Bentham’ in Rationalism in Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1991) 132. On Oakeshott’s understandings of the rule of law and authority, see N.B. Reynolds, ‘Grounding 
the Rule of Law’ (1989) 1 Ratio Juris 2 and R. Friedman, ‘Oakeshott on the Authority of Law’ (1989) 1 Ratio 
Juris 27.  
19 Insofar as our objective is to sketch the rationalistic tendency within the study of public law, our focus is 
primarily (though not exclusively) on academic public lawyers. Plainly, it is not only academics who engage 
in the study of public law; judges, civil servants, and practitioners do so as well. But as we will see, the 
study of public law by academics is particularly susceptible to rationalism. As will also become clear, 
rationalism in the study of public law has important consequences for the practice of public law. 
 5
our understandings of the constitution. We argue that these various sites reinforce 
the progressive nature of rationalism, in the sense that the rationalistic propensity 
increases in intensity and scope over time, rendering public lawyers less and less 
adept at acquiring and imparting a working understanding of the constitution. We 
conclude by calling for a renewed engagement within the study of public law with 
the varied and varying practices of political and legal actors. As we see it, the 
rationalistic tendencies evident within the search for principle in public law risk 
developing an understanding of the constitution that focuses only on, and in turn 
exaggerates, certain features of our political and legal arrangements and, in this 
way, provides a false and misleading education in public law. Rationalism in public 
law is liable, we argue, to reduce the complexities and idiosyncrasies of our 
political and legal arrangements to little more than a placeholder constitution. 
 
II.  RATIONALISM 
In ‘Rationalism in Politics’, Oakeshott offers a critique of rationalism.20 The target 
of his critique is neither reason nor rationality. Rational conduct, Oakeshott notes, 
‘is something no man is required to be ashamed of’.21 His target is instead ‘the 
Rationalist’, a personification22 of the misuse of reason that is characteristic of the 
rationalistic propensity. No one writer (or group of writers) is singled out as the 
Rationalist(s).23 This is important inasmuch as Oakeshott has been criticised for 
arguing against a ‘straw man’; that is to say, his account of rationalism is 
challenged as being one to which no serious person subscribes.24 The challenge is 
misplaced. His concern is with a propensity that is only partially embraced—and, 
as we shall see, by its very nature can only ever be incompletely embraced—by 
any one person. The Rationalist is no one, and yet he is everyone. No one is ever 
the Rationalist, but each of us can recognise ourselves in his character and 
disposition from time to time. The Rationalist, in other words, exhibits a 
propensity that from one person to the next is more or less present—including, 
for some, even in the writing of Oakeshott himself.25 So pervasive is this 
rationalistic propensity that, in Oakeshott’s view, it has ‘come to colour the ideas, 
not merely of one, but of all political persuasions, and to flow over every party 
line’.26  
                                                 
20 Oakeshott’s was not the only critique of rationalism in the 1940s and 1950s: see, generally, S.R. Letwin, 
‘Rationalism, Principles and Politics’ (1952) 14 Review of Politics 367. 
21 Oakeshott, ‘Rational Conduct’ in Rationalism in Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991) 
99, 100. 
22 Throughout the text, we follow Oakeshott’s usage and employ the masculine pronouns ‘him’ and ‘his’ 
when referring to ‘the Rationalist’. This should not be taken to imply that rationalism in politics or, as we 
review below, in public law is a propensity displayed only by members of one sex. 
23 Oakeshott cites some writers as displaying rationalist tendencies—including Locke, Hayek and Marx—
but none is singled out as exemplifying rationalism in quite the manner of the Rationalist. 
24 See e.g. D. Kettler, ‘The Cheerful Discourses of Michael Oakeshott’ (1964) 16 World Politics 483, 488; 
and J.R. Archer, ‘Oakeshott on Politics’ (1979) 41 Journal of Politics 150, 153-154.  
25 See e.g. N. Wood, ‘A Guide to the Classics: The Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott’ (1959) 21 Journal of 
Politics 646, 660; and D. Spitz, ‘A Rationalist Malgré Lui: The Perplexities of Being Michael Oakeshott’ 
(1976) 4 Political Theory 335, 341. 
26 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, n 15 above, 5. 
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Distinguishing the rationalistic propensity is an unshakeable faith in the power of 
reason to identify exact, complete, and orderly solutions to the practical problems 
that arise in the real world. Reasoning by reference to and in terms of a set of 
abstract principles, the Rationalist prioritises well-reasoned and well-ordered, even 
if untried, solutions over the tried and tested, but often untidy established ways of 
doing things. From the Rationalist’s vantage point, established practices must be 
brought before the altar of reason and are to be left in place only if justified by 
reason. In this, the Rationalist dismisses the contingencies of the real world that 
might lead him to question untested solutions suggested by abstract reasoning. As 
Oakeshott sees it, the Rationalist’s belief in the power of reason culminates in its 
misuse. The Rationalist’s error is not that he recognises the authority of reason, 
but that he recognises no authority except that of reason and, even then, as will 
become clear, only by equating reason with a special kind of technique.27 
From Oakeshott’s perspective, the ‘hidden spring’ beneath the Rationalist’s error 
is a distinction between two broad species of knowledge: technical knowledge and 
practical knowledge.28 Technical knowledge can be formulated into a set of more or 
less precise rules, principles, and maxims that are capable of being learned by 
rote.29 Since technical knowledge is capable of being formulated into more or less 
precise rules, it tends to be associated with a semblance of order, certainty, and 
completeness. Though skill and insight are often required to formulate technical 
knowledge into rules, principles and maxims, it is a species of knowledge that can 
often be found in and (subject to an important qualification below) learned from 
books.30 It is the knowledge found, for example, in instruction manuals, cookery 
books, and legal textbooks.  
Practical knowledge, by contrast, is not susceptible to precise formulation. It 
comprises sensibilities, dispositions, understandings, intuitions and judgments—
or, in more everyday parlance, skills, talents, and knacks—that typically find 
expression in the customary way of doing things.31 Practical knowledge is neither 
taught nor learned, only imparted and acquired, and often seems imprecise, 
uncertain, and incomplete as a result. As Oakeshott puts it, practical knowledge 
‘exists only in practice’ and can be acquired ‘only by continuous contact with one 
who is perpetually practising it’.32 The subtle skill and craft of the cook is 
Oakeshott’s most famous illustration of practical knowledge. The cook’s practical 
knowledge cannot be reduced to the text of a cookery book. It can be acquired 
only through experience—and, in particular, through an apprenticeship in which 
the craft of cooking is learnt from and transmitted between cooks. In the kitchen, 
the junior cook learns not only technique from the more experienced cook, but 
                                                 
27 ibid, 6.  
28 ibid, 11. There are oft-noted overlaps between the distinction Oakeshott draws and that drawn by Gilbert 
Ryle between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’: G. Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’ (1945-46) 46 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1.  
29 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, n 15 above, 14. 
30 As Robert Grant puts it, technical knowledge ‘can be put into and got out of books’: Oakeshott (London: 
Claridge Press, 1990) 48. 
31 See K. Minogue, ‘Modes and Modesty’ in J. Norman (ed), The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott (London: 
Duckworth, 1993) 43, 52. 
32 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, n 15 above, 15. 
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acquires a set of sensibilities, skills and judgments as well, often ‘without it ever 
having been precisely imparted’, and ‘without being able to say precisely what it 
is’.33 On Oakeshott’s understanding, the technique learned by the cook can be said 
to be secondary, not only in relation to the craft of cooking, but also in the sense 
that it cannot be ‘put into practice’ without the practical knowledge needed to 
understand and employ it. 
Oakeshott’s claim is that both technical knowledge and practical knowledge are 
involved in most human activities. As Oakeshott explains, ‘nobody supposes that 
the knowledge that belongs to the good cook is confined to what is or may be 
written down in the cookery book’; technique and practical knowledge ‘combine 
to make skill in cookery wherever it exists’.34 Whenever people are engaged in art, 
science, or politics, it is never enough merely to have learned the relevant rules 
(technical knowledge); they must also know how and when to apply those rules, 
and when to depart from them (practical knowledge).35 No matter how explicit, 
formal, and comprehensive a set of rules purports to be, whosoever seeks to apply 
rules inevitably calls upon a kind of practical knowledge that cannot be found in 
or learned from a rulebook.36 The Rationalist, in Oakeshott’s account, misses this. 
He treats technical knowledge as if it were the only useful type of knowledge 
involved in every human activity; in other words, he treats technical knowledge as 
self-complete, failing to appreciate that ‘learning a technique does not consist in 
getting rid of pure ignorance but in reforming knowledge which is already there’.37 
The Rationalist’s attachment to technical knowledge and his willingness to divorce 
it from practical knowledge are easily explained. Technical knowledge is the only 
knowledge that satisfies the Rationalist’s ‘search for order and distinctness’ and 
‘the standard of certainty which the Rationalist has chosen’.38 As Oakeshott views 
it, this attraction to order, certainty, neatness and completeness is matched by, and 
partly the product of, the Rationalist’s ‘irritable nervousness in the face of 
everything topical and transitory’.39 For the Rationalist, ‘nothing is of value merely 
because it exists (and certainly not because it has existed for many generations), 
familiarity has no worth, and nothing is to be left standing for want of scrutiny’.40 
Everything must be tested and, at the end of the day, justified in terms of reason. 
The Rationalist’s disposition is to bring ‘the social, political, legal and institutional 
inheritance of his society before the tribunal of his intellect’, with an inclination 
                                                 
33 ibid, 15. 
34 ibid, 12-13. In a similar vein, he explains that ‘it would be excessively liberal to call a man a Christian who 
was wholly ignorant of the technical side of Christianity, who knew nothing of creed or formulary, but it 
would be even more absurd to maintain that even the readiest knowledge of creed and catechism ever 
constituted the whole of the knowledge that belongs to a Christian’ (at 13). 
35 In a later work, Oakeshott puts it in these terms: ‘It is only in fantasy that … to understand [a practice] is 
to know one’s way around a rule-book’: On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 91. 
36 As Oakeshott puts it: ‘a pianist requires artistry as well as technique, a chess-player style and insight into 
the game as well as a knowledge of the moves, and a scientist acquires (among other things) the sort of 
judgment which tells him when his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which enables 
him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore’: ‘Rationalism in Politics’, n 15 
above, 15. 
37 ibid, 17. 
38 ibid, 6, 16. 
39 ibid, 7. 
40 ibid, 8.  
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always to prefer ‘the invention of a new device to making use of a current and 
well-tried expedient’.41 In short, the Rationalist’s impulse is to reform. When 
considering how to reform, the Rationalist maintains that universally applicable 
and uniform solutions are always the best solutions. There is never a place for ‘a 
best in the circumstances’, only a place for ‘the best’, since ‘the function of reason 
is precisely to surmount circumstances’.42 
Though critical of the rationalistic disposition, Oakeshott’s account is not wholly 
unsympathetic. The Rationalist is motivated by a deeply held, if sadly misdirected 
desire to improve upon his inheritance. However, in the pursuit of improvements, 
the Rationalist displays ‘no aptitude for that close and detailed appreciation of 
what actually presents itself’ and, in this, demonstrates how he lacks the ‘power of 
accepting the mysteries and uncertainties of experience’.43 It seems little wonder, 
then, that the Rationalist finds no real value in practical knowledge. The only true 
type of knowledge is that which can be clearly, precisely, and explicitly articulated 
in a set of rules, principles, and maxims. By neglecting the importance of practical 
knowledge, and by assuming that all knowledge is necessarily technical, the 
Rationalist’s first error is to mistake a part for the whole. He then compounds this 
error by seeking to reduce ‘the tangle and variety of experience to a set of 
principles’ that can then be justified or criticised ‘upon rational grounds’. The 
Rationalist displays no appreciation for ‘the cumulation of experience, only of the 
readiness of experience when it has been converted into a formula’.44 In this, he 
fails to grasp how, in purporting to reduce practical knowledge to a set of rules 
and, subsequently, seeking to develop a knack and feel for how to follow the 
resulting rulebook, he is necessarily, even if unselfconsciously, acquiring and 
employing practical knowledge.  
For Oakeshott, the rationalist tendency to reduce practical knowledge to technical 
knowledge is a feature discernible, to varying degrees, in every human activity. But 
as will become clear, Oakeshott regards this propensity as having special relevance 
to, and an especially pernicious effect on, politics. For when searching for perfect, 
universal, and rational solutions to the succession of crises that, from the 
rationalistic vantage point, constitute political life,45 the Rationalist treats his 
preferred set of principles, maxims, and rules as an ‘ideology’. In other words, the 
Rationalist’s belief in the sovereignty of reason translates into the sovereignty of 
ideology.46 This notion of ‘ideology’ links Oakeshott’s two essays ‘Rationalism in 
Politics’ and ‘Political Education’ for, though he nowhere says so explicitly, the 
consequence of rationalism in politics is that the Rationalist treats principles as 
ideology in ways that pervert not only political activity, but also the place and role of 
principles in understanding it. 
 
                                                 
41 ibid, 8. 
42 ibid, 10. 
43 ibid, 6. 
44 ibid, 6. 
45 ibid, 10. 
46 ibid, 27. 
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III.  RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 
In ‘Political Education’, Oakeshott suggests that an ideology comprises an abstract 
principle (or a set of abstract principles) ‘which has been independently 
premeditated’.47 The chief characteristic of an ideology is that it treats principles as 
ends to be pursued. Equating rationalistic politics with ideological politics, 
Oakeshott argues that the Rationalist’s approach to the practice and study of 
politics is first to discover the meaning of a given principle and then to design 
political and social arrangements in line with that meaning.48 At its simplest, the 
rationalistic style supposes that we are unable to engage in political activity until 
we have answered questions such as: What is liberty? What is justice? What is 
democracy?49 In this style of politics, we are drawn to want to do the liberal thing, 
the just thing or the democratic thing and so orient our study of politics to determining 
the meaning of these principles. For Oakeshott, this style of politics is ideological 
in two ways. 
First, it supposes that words like ‘liberty’, ‘justice’, and ‘democracy’ have settled 
meanings that can be premeditated in advance of political activity.50 This approach 
divorces the principle ‘liberty’ from those activities that are described as ‘liberal’, 
the principle ‘justice’ from ‘just’ activities, and the principle ‘democracy’ from the 
activities described as ‘democratic’. Significantly, it supposes that the principle is 
prior to the activity, rather than indebted to and embedded in it. Second, this 
approach to making sense of political activity is liable to generate an ‘intellectual 
dilemma’, whereby we find that our favoured principles sometimes pull in one 
direction while practical judgment pulls in another.51 Oakeshott gives the example 
of the liberal who, in the name of ‘liberalism’, abhors censorship and yet 
‘occasions arise when his practical judgment tells him that what is being said is too 
dangerous to be tolerated’.52 Disposed to compromise principle for practical 
judgment, the liberal ‘feels guilty’ and ‘looks to himself like a traitor’. He cannot 
reassure himself that he has ‘done the right thing’ and, instead, blames the world 
for frustrating his efforts to be a liberal.53 His commitment to the principle 
precludes him from revising it on account of experience, for his principle has but 
a one way relationship to practice: to guide it. In this way, political ideology treats 
principles as ideas that exist in advance of, and independently from, the concrete 
activities to which they relate.  
For Oakeshott, the Rationalist views his task as deploying premeditated principles 
to make (or re-make) the arrangements of a political community.54 The Rationalist 
does this without concern for how those arrangements are currently ‘attended 
                                                 
47 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 48. A similar theme animates Oakeshott’s essay 
‘Conduct and Ideology in Politics’, first published c.1955 and reprinted in What is History? and other essays 
(Exeter: Imprint, 2004) 245. 
48 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, ibid, 48.  
49 Oakeshott, ‘Conduct and Ideology’, note 47 above, 245. 
50 ibid, 250. 
51 ibid, 245-246. 
52 ibid, 246. 
53 ibid, 246, 247. 
54 Oakeshott ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 56.  
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to’.55 His ideology is, or so he thinks, without debt to how others before him have 
attended to the arrangements of his community.56 Seeing only the ‘blank sheet of 
infinite possibility’, the Rationalist overlooks how he is situated within an existing 
set of arrangements and fails to appreciate how, at any point in time, ‘the 
arrangements which are enjoyed always far exceed those which are recognized to 
stand in need of attention’.57  
How might political principles be otherwise understood? Oakeshott resituates the 
starting point for understanding a principle: rather than begin with an abstract idea, 
Oakeshott begins with a concrete manner of activity.58 Just as technical knowledge 
summarises practical knowledge, so principles are, for Oakeshott, ‘short-hand 
expressions of what we know to be exceedingly intricate manners of behaviour’.59 
In Oakeshott’s understanding, concrete politics precedes abstract principle: 
‘political activity comes first and a political ideology follows after’.60 Drawing on 
his favourite example of cooking, Oakeshott explains how a cookery book ‘is not 
an independently generated beginning from which cooking can spring; it is 
nothing more than an abstract of somebody’s knowledge of how to cook; it is the 
stepchild, not the parent of the activity’.61 In the same way that the cookery book 
presupposes somebody who already knows something about how to cook and at 
the end of the day is an abridgment of the craft of cookery, so a principle should 
be understood not as some premeditated beginning, but rather as abstract and 
generalised knowledge of a concrete political activity.62  
Political ideology is, on this understanding, an abbreviation of an activity that is 
already a feature of political life. Yet, the special danger with a political ideology is 
how it encourages us to view a set of abstract principles as complete and self-
contained guides to political activity. For the Rationalist, because an ideology is ‘a 
body of principles not itself in debt to the activity of attending to the 
arrangements of a society, it is [thought] able to determine and guide the direction 
of that activity’.63 In this way, the truth that ideologies can only ever be shorthand 
summaries of much richer, more complex and finely grained activities becomes 
obscured.64 It is thus that Oakeshott invites us to reflect on how the French 
                                                 
55 In ‘Political Education’, Oakeshott defines politics as ‘the activity of attending to the general arrangements 
of a collection of people’: ibid, 56 (emphasis added). This use of ‘attending’ is intended to signal that 
politics is an activity that occurs within an already existing political realm that is given definition by 
prevailing institutions and practices. This leads Oakeshott to view politics as ‘the art of the statesman… 
not the rationalism of the social engineer’: M. Oakeshott, ‘Scientific Politics’ (1947-48) 1 Cambridge Journal 
347, 355. 
56 Oakeshott ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 49.  
57 ibid, 45. 
58 Oakeshott, ‘Conduct and Ideology’, note 46 above, 250-251. 
59 ibid, 251. 
60 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 51. See also M. Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, Lectures in the 
History of Political Thought (ed. T. Nardin and L. O’Sullivan, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006) 31, 34 where 
he observes that ‘[we] begin…with an experience, the experience of political life and political activity. 
Without this there can be no political thought’. 
61 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, ibid, 52. 
62 ibid, 52. 
63 ibid, 51. 
64 ibid, 54-55. A political ideology is ‘a traditional manner of attending to the arrangements of a society 
which has been abridged into a doctrine of ends to be pursued’, with ‘the abridgment (together with the 
necessary technical knowledge) being erroneously regarded as the sold guide relied upon’. 
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Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and John Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government are often understood to be statements of principle 
‘ready and waiting to be put into practice for the first time’, as if they were a 
‘preface to political activity’.65 On the contrary, suggests Oakeshott, they have ‘all 
the marks of a postscript’ rooted in actual political experience. The ‘pedigree of 
every political ideology’, Oakeshott observes, ‘shows it to be the creature, not of 
premeditation in advance of political activity, but of meditation upon a manner of 
politics’.66 Oakeshott’s lesson, then, is that political ideologies (and the principles 
that find expression in them) do not ‘provide the whole of the knowledge used in 
political activity’.67 This does not deny that a political ideology can, nonetheless, 
be useful to abbreviate a complex activity: the ‘distorting mirror of an ideology 
will reveal important hidden passages in a tradition, as a caricature reveals the 
potentialities of a face’.68 But the risk with the ideological style of politics is that it 
implies that knowledge of a chosen ideology or set of principles can take the place 
of an understanding of, and an education in, what Oakeshott terms ‘traditions of 
behaviour’.69  
To understand traditions of behaviour, it is not possible to rely merely on a set of 
abstract principles. As Oakeshott explains, there is always ‘something of a mystery 
about how a tradition of political behaviour is learned, and perhaps the only 
certainty is that there is no point at which learning it can properly be said to begin’ 
or to end.70 Political education requires that we observe and engage with those 
who are already involved in the traditions of political behaviour. To be clear, this 
process of observing and, in time, understanding a tradition of behaviour does not 
require suspension of judgment, avoidance of criticism, or eschewal of the desire 
to improve and correct. An apprenticeship in political activity entails participation 
in a tradition of behaviour, but it does not preclude the criticism or reform of that 
tradition.71 Indeed, as Oakeshott sees it, participation in a tradition requires critical 
reflection upon it. In the changing circumstances of political life, the decision 
whether to carry on a tradition in some novel context requires reflecting upon that 
tradition and deciding whether to carry it on or to transform it. This bears 
emphasis: nowhere does Oakeshott suggest that criticism or reform of prevailing 
traditions is impossible; his point is merely that criticism and reform must begin 
                                                 
65 ibid, 53. 
66 ibid, 53, 51 (emphasis added). 
67 ibid, 58. 
68 ibid, 58. 
69 Since some readers might rankle at Oakeshott’s use of the word ‘traditions’, it is worth noting that in 
later writings Oakeshott substituted ‘practices’ for ‘traditions of behaviour’. See generally S. Soininem, From 
‘a Necessary Evil’ to the Art of Contingency: Michael Oakeshott’s Conception of Political Activity (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2005) 126. 
70 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 62. 
71 Some might object that this is undiluted conservatism. However, for the argument that ‘[i]t is a grave 
misunderstanding to assume that emphasis on the essential factor of tradition which enters into all 
understanding implies an uncritical acceptance of tradition and socio-political conservatism’, see generally 
H. Gadamer, ‘The Problem of Historical Consciousness’ in P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretative 
Social Science: A Second Look (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) 103, 108. 
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with an understanding of the tradition. Differently put: criticism of a tradition 
comes from within the tradition itself.72  
It is important to emphasise what Oakeshott does not suggest about traditions of 
behaviour. For Oakeshott, a tradition is ‘not a fixed and inflexible manner of 
doing things’.73 His is not a Burkean traditionalism that assumes that traditions are 
coherent and settled and reflect some natural evolution.74 Rather, for Oakeshott, 
traditions are contingent, uncertain, incoherent and contradictory, with a political 
community required to reflect on and choose between rival and opposing 
understandings of a tradition.75 How, then, should a political community choose 
between competing understandings? Oakeshott’s response is to note that there is 
no one principle that can guide a political community; consideration must instead 
be given to a variety of contingent and circumstantial considerations. In all of this, 
what is noteworthy is that Oakeshott’s account of tradition does not seek to 
safeguard an established way of doing things and thereby to frustrate change and 
protect the status quo. Nor is his a determinism that relieves the community from 
choosing between rival courses of action.76 Traditions are instead best understood 
as ‘a flow of sympathy’ intimated in practices, customs, conventions, institutions 
and laws diffused between past, present and future, with politics being ‘the 
exploration of that sympathy’.77 We are always learning a tradition and, because a 
tradition is carried on until it is not, there is a participatory quality at the heart of 
traditions of behaviour.  
Oakeshott’s central concern is to suggest that the more ‘we understand our own 
political tradition, the more readily its whole resources are available to us’, and the 
less likely we are to embrace the illusion that the abridgment of a tradition into a 
set of principles is a sufficient guide to political activity.78 The risk of ideological 
politics is that the complexities of a tradition of behaviour will be ‘squeezed out in 
the process’ of abridging that tradition into a principle.79 The resulting tragedy is 
not only that the Rationalist misguidedly thinks that technical knowledge, political 
principles, and ideologies are sufficient for the practice of politics, but also that 
the Rationalist is unable to remedy his predicament. For the rationalistic style of 
politics is progressive, in the sense that the Rationalist over time becomes less and 
                                                 
72 See Franco, n 2 above, 137. 
73 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 59. 
74 The epistemological claims about the relationship between technical knowledge and practical knowledge 
underpinning Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism are perhaps the most striking contrast with Burke. See P. 
Franco, Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 83-85.  
75 From an Oakeshottian perspective, traditions are the starting point of political activity, not a destination 
for, as MacIntyre observes, ‘[t]raditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict’: A. MacIntyre, After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (3rd edn, London: Duckworth, 2007) 222. 
76 As Oakeshott notes, a tradition of behaviour ‘is not a groove within which we are destined to grind out 
our helpless and unsatisfying lives’: Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 58. 
77 ibid, 58. To critics who characterised his account of traditions of behaviour as mysticism, Oakeshott 
replied that it was ‘an exceedingly matter-of-fact description of the characteristics of any tradition’, and 
cites the common law and the British constitution as examples: ibid, 61, footnote 8. 
78 ibid, 66. 
79 ibid, 55. Related to this, Mackenzie notes that a further danger in the process of abridging a tradition: the 
Rationalist may ‘try to give the abridgment a completeness which is impossible, filling it out with 
something other than political experience’. See W.J.M. Mackenzie, ‘Political Theory and Political 
Education’ (1955-56) 9 Universities Quarterly 351, 358. 
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less adept at observing and understanding tradition—and, in turn, acquiring and 
imparting practical knowledge. As Oakeshott notes, the Rationalist not only 
‘neglect[s] the kind of knowledge which would save him, he begins by destroying 
it’.80 Admittedly, the Rationalist could be educated out of his rationalism, but this 
would require that he immerse himself in, and appreciate the importance of, 
practical knowledge of traditions of behaviour; the very things he is loath to do. 
For having initially articulated an account of principles based on his understanding 
of traditions, the Rationalist ultimately divorces his principles from the underlying 
traditions, and in time forgets how to make sense of the traditions themselves. All 
the Rationalist is left with is a shorthand summary that, in his hands, is converted 
into an ideology.81 Our concern is that something similar can be said of principles 
in the hands of public lawyers.  
IV.  PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC LAW 
Although Oakeshott offers his critique of rationalism with politics in mind, it has 
a much wider relevance. Our contention is that a rationalistic propensity similar to 
that which Oakeshott discerns in politics is an aspect of, and a partial explanation 
for, the many efforts of public lawyers to modernise, formalise and, in the final 
analysis, rationalise the British constitution. This phenomenon—which, echoing 
Oakeshott, we label rationalism in public law—cannot be encapsulated in anything as 
concise and neat as a definition (and, indeed, to reduce an intellectual propensity 
to a definition would be rationalistic). It is possible, however, to sketch the broad 
contours of a rationalistic propensity among public lawyers. This sketch, we 
readily acknowledge, abridges a complex tradition and it bears special mention 
that our concern with rationalism in public law is neither with all public lawyers 
nor with all public law. Like Oakeshott’s Rationalist, no one public lawyer exhibits 
a rationalist propensity in every respect, yet each of us can recognise how it 
manifests itself in our thinking from time to time, and for some more often than 
others. This propensity prioritises technical knowledge over practical knowledge 
in ways that reveal a ‘principle first, practice second’ approach to the study of the 
constitution. Our objective is to explain why this misconceives the relationship 
between principles and constitutional activity and culminates in a distorted 
conception of ‘principles as ideology’ in public law. Our starting point, however, is 
to explain why practical knowledge has, or ought to have, a special significance for 
public lawyers. 
In one very basic sense, practical knowledge undergirds the study of all legal 
disciplines, perhaps especially so in the common law. Every common lawyer must 
develop a knack for reading cases and interpreting statutes. Discerning the ratio of 
cases and identifying the important obiter dicta in lengthy concurring judgments 
takes skill. Employing precedent creatively involves a feel for how far established 
and emerging legal norms can be stretched. Knowing when and how to interpret 
statutory terms in light of the purposes of a statute as whole requires judgment. 
The subtle craft of reading cases, employing precedent, and interpreting statutes 
is, in other words, the practical knowledge that underlies and informs the 
                                                 
80 Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, note 16 above, 37. 
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common law method. As Loughlin observes, there is a real sense in which ‘the 
common law habit of thinking is, at root, a form of practical knowledge’,82 where 
rules and principles of the common law are ‘not the well-spring of knowledge but 
are to be understood as cribs which may be used effectively only by someone who 
has been educated in the traditions of the common law’.83  
Though indispensable for every common lawyer, practical knowledge can be said 
to hold a special significance for public lawyers, for not only must public lawyers 
immerse themselves in the culture of the common law, they must also develop a 
good grasp of the practices, conventions, customs, institutions, and long-standing 
relationships that give Britain’s customary constitution its distinctive character. To 
simplify for the purposes of exposition, public law could be said to combine 
practical knowledge of the common law with practical knowledge of the traditions 
of parliamentary government.84 Like the common law, there is a strong strand of 
anti-rationalism running throughout Britain’s parliamentary government, with its 
confusing customs, overlapping personnel and functions and its irregular working 
practices. In his account of The English Constitution, Bagehot would write that the 
British have not so much made as ‘stumbled on’ a constitution, a constitution 
that, from the design point of view, is ‘full of every species of incidental defect’ 
and ‘of the worst workmanship in all out-of-the-way matters of any constitution 
in the world’. He would add that notwithstanding these flaws, the constitution 
‘can work more simply and easily, and better than any instrument of government 
that has yet been tried’.85  
In drawing special attention to practical knowledge in public law, ours is not the 
rehearsed point that conventions enjoy an especially prominent place within our 
constitutional arrangements. Public lawyers readily acknowledge that legal rules 
must be read in light of and by reference to conventional practices, and that such 
conventions are often more important than and substantially qualify the operation 
of legal rules. Nor is our point merely that a historical perspective is important 
when studying a constitution that has evolved not from a rationally designed 
template, but as a result of political experience.86 Most would accept that the study 
of public law must be sensitive to a historical understanding of practice. Our point 
is instead that to know and understand the British constitution requires a type of 
knowledge that captures its blurred edges, abstruseness, and idiosyncrasies. Stated 
otherwise: knowledge and understanding of the constitution does not lend itself to 
                                                 
82 As Loughlin puts it, ‘the common law habit of thinking is, at root, a form of practical knowledge: Legality 
and Locality, note 11 above, 375. The importance of practical knowledge leads Loughlin to characterise the 
common law method as ‘anti-rationalist’: ‘Tinkering with the Constitution’ (1988) 51 MLR 531, 536. 
83 M. Loughlin, ‘Rights Discourse and Public Law Thought in the UK’ in G.W. Anderson (ed.), Rights and 
Democracy: Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism (London: Blackstone Press, 1999) 193, [194/195]. 
84 As Oakeshott notes, ‘the institutions of parliamentary government sprang form the least rationalistic 
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(in conjunction with the common law) with the limitation of the exercise of political power’: Oakeshott, 
‘Scientific Politics’, note 56 above, 357. 
85 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution [1867] (ed P. Smith, Cambridge: CUP, 2001) 8 (emphasis omitted). 
86 There remains much truth to Maitland’s observation that ‘the more we study our constitution, whether 
in the present or the past, the less do we find it conform to any such plan as a philosopher might invent in 
his study’: F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: CUP, 1908) 197. 
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the sort of precise formulations associated with technical knowledge.87 It requires 
the practical knowledge that finds expression in a nebulous set of sensibilities, 
impulses, and intuitions; knowledge that is essential for making sense of a 
constitution that is, in important respects and to an unusual degree, ‘a summation 
of political experience expressed through forms, processes, traditions and 
developments and substantiated by longevity, continuity, assimilation and 
adaptation’.88  
There remains an important role for technical knowledge in public law, together 
with the rules, principles and maxims associated with it. But it is a secondary role. 
The role is necessarily secondary inasmuch as practical knowledge is required to 
understand and deploy the rules, principles and maxims that are the expression of 
technical knowledge. To illustrate this, consider what Adam Tomkins calls the 
‘simple—and beautiful—rule’89 that the government of the day can continue in 
office only for so long as it retains the confidence of the House of Commons. 
Though this rule may seem simple on the pages of a book, its workings are subtle 
and complex in ways that cannot be captured by any neat and simple formulation. 
As Geoffrey Marshall noted, the rule that the government resigns when it loses 
the confidence of the Commons must be augmented by the words ‘except when it 
remains in office’.90 Similarly, it might be suggested that there is a rule according 
to which ‘ministers speak and vote together’, except, of course, ‘when they cannot 
agree to do so’, just as the rule that ‘ministers offer their individual resignations if 
serious errors are made in their Departments’ must be qualified with ‘except when 
they retain their posts or are given peerages’.91 Exceptions to such rules cannot be 
reduced to simple formulae; they resist appeals to simplicity and not least because 
exceptions vary over time and sometimes eventually upend the general rule. It 
follows that when analysing whether a minister should resign for a serious 
departmental failure or whether the government of the day should fall for lack of 
confidence, public lawyers must not only know the rule and its exceptions, but 
also have a feel for how the two interact in the concrete circumstances of the 
constitution. The ‘simple and beautiful rule’ is best understood by public lawyers 
who attend to and have a good grasp of the practices and traditions of behaviour 
summarised by it. Or differently put: the claim about the continued importance of 
ministerial responsibility central to so much of the scholarship of Adam Tomkins 
is perhaps least well understood when presented as a rule in the opening pages of 
Our Republican Constitution and best understood when considered in the context of 
                                                 
87 As Bagehot observes, those who look ‘at the living reality [of the constitution] will wonder at the 
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90 G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984) 54.  
91 ibid, 54. 
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his detailed and careful examination of practices which strengthen parliamentary 
mechanisms of accountability in his book entitled Public Law.92  
Our claim, then, is that there is an important sense in which practical knowledge 
enjoys, or ought to enjoy, primacy over technical knowledge in the study of public 
law. At the core of rationalism in public law is the reversal of this relationship: a 
rationalistic propensity leads public lawyers to subjugate practical knowledge to 
technical knowledge.93 This propensity is perhaps most obvious when public 
lawyers seek to convert practical knowledge into, to replace it by, or to act in the 
pursuit of a set of principles. It is most obvious, in other words, in the search for 
principle within public law. There are, as we see it, three main and related ‘sites’ 
where rationalism in public law is readily, even if not unambiguously, discernible. 
V. THREE SITES OF RATIONALISM IN PUBLIC LAW 
A first site of rationalism in public law is the classroom and lecture theatre—or, 
more generally, pedagogy in public law. The grip of the textbook tradition remains 
strong within public law teaching. This tradition depicts law as a coherent, unified 
and orderly body of rules grounded in, and logically derived from, a set of general 
principles.94 With an emphasis on elucidating and systematising a set of principles, 
teaching within the textbook tradition privileges simplicity of exposition and, as a 
result, downplays aberrations and exceptions, even where the results verge on the 
dogmatic.95 Presenting legal rules as logical deductions from underlying principles, 
the textbook tradition relegates the importance of history and politics, and instead 
envisages law as a kind of scientific or, in Oakeshott’s terminology, technical 
knowledge. Having sidelined both history and politics to a greater or lesser 
degree,96 teaching within the textbook tradition selects, abridges, and abstracts 
from the miscellany of public law to identify certain principles, among them 
democracy, political equality and the rule of law. The result is an emphasis on 
order, precision, and certainty, all at the cost of habit, custom, and tradition. Some 
synthesising and simplification is necessary if seeking to impart an understanding 
of aspects of the constitution to students. However, the teaching of public law 
within the textbook tradition frequently fails to acknowledge that the materials 
being taught are mere abridgements of more complex political and legal traditions. 
Our concern is that if statutes, cases, and administrative decisions become 
examples and illustrations of principles, rather than being acknowledged, at least 
in part, as their foundations and grounds, the relationship of principle to practice 
becomes unidirectional and hierarchical, with the workings of the constitution 
relegated to secondary status.  
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Pedagogy in public law follows the path initiated by one of the founding fathers of 
the textbook tradition, A.V. Dicey.97 The study of the constitution, as Dicey saw 
it, required a ‘search for the guidance of first principles’.98 In purporting to make 
sense of the constitution via a set of legal principles—parliamentary sovereignty, 
the rule of law, and conventions—Dicey elevated law and its claims to reason, 
order and certainty over politics and history.99 In doing so, Dicey envisaged the 
relationship between law and politics ‘the wrong way around’100 and purported to 
expound a set of fundamental legal principles at the very heart of a customary 
constitution. He cautioned students of the British constitution to ‘remember that 
antiquarianism is not law’ because such an historical account ‘throws from a legal 
point of view no light upon’ the constitution at all.101 Students of public law were 
not to concern themselves with history; their task was instead to attend to the 
nature and content of the constitution through the articulation of its basic legal 
principles. Encouraging a vision of the constitution as rational and ordered, Dicey 
summarised the task of the English professor of law as ‘to state what are the laws 
which form part of the constitution, to arrange them in their order, to explain 
their meaning, and to exhibit where possible their logical connection’.102 The 
result was that Dicey’s overly neat division of the constitution into three 
foundational principles was ultimately ‘rendered static by his relegation of the 
historical view and consequent focus on constitutional form’.103  
In light of this elevation of a set of legal principles abstracted from historical and 
political context, Dicey is perhaps best understood as a ‘simplifier’104—or, as we 
would put it, a ‘rationaliser’—of Britain’s customary constitution. It is true that 
Dicey’s work combines elements of rationalism and anti-rationalism, the latter 
finding strongest expression in his rejection of codified constitutions.105 To the 
extent, however, that his seminal work exaggerated a small number of features of 
the prevailing political and legal arrangements in ways that distorted the ability of 
his readers to make sense of constitutional traditions, Dicey might be said to have 
contributed to the rationalisation of Britain’s constitution. It is for this reason 
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technical knowledge than practical knowledge: ibid 33. For the suggestion that Dicey viewed principles as 
different from rules, inasmuch as he conceived of the former as generalisations that lack such precision as 
to be applicable with confidence to novel questions of law, but instead indicate the broad direction to 
which rules tend: see Walters, note 97 above, 34-35. 
100 Loughlin, ‘The Pathways of Public Law Scholarship’, note 96 above, 163. 
101 Dicey, note 98 above, 14.  
102 ibid, 3-4. 
103 J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge: CUP, 
2007) 9. 
104 Mount, note 1 above, 39. 
105 On the inconsistent strands to Dicey’s work, as well as an account of his various contributions to the 
development of legal education, see D. Sugarman, ‘The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and 
Legal Science’ (1983) 46 MLR 102.  
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that, as foreshadowed above, we consider it unhelpful to associate Dicey and 
Oakeshott as closely as Loughlin does. True, there are overlapping themes in their 
writings. It is plain, for example, that Dicey is moved by a profound concern for 
the value of practical experience as expressed in the common law.106 They also 
both exhibit a patriotic pride in the workings of the constitution.107 All that said, 
by associating Dicey so closely with Oakeshott, Loughlin’s pairing of these two 
thinkers within a style of public law (‘conservative normativism’) obscures the 
extent to which a rationalistic tendency within Dicey’s writing distorts, in ways 
Oakeshott predicted, an understanding of the constitution that has dominated, 
and to a greater or lesser extent continues to dominate, public law. It is true that 
Loughlin notes that Dicey’s account of the principles of the constitution is best 
read as no more than a ‘crib’, or abridgment, of more complex constitutional 
traditions of behaviour.108 We agree. What bears emphasis, however, is that Dicey 
did not himself present his account in this way, and nor has it been taken as a 
‘crib’ by successive generations of public lawyers—for these reasons, the 
connection Loughlin maps between Dicey and Oakeshott is likely to obscure the 
potential for Oakeshott’s work to shed some light on the contemporary state of 
public law. 
A second site of rationalism is the theoretical turn in the study of public law. That 
theorising in public law is more explicit and extensive than ever before is plain for 
all to see.109 Old theories are being reformulated in novel ways,110 while theories 
once thought to have little or no relevance now receive book-length treatments,111 
all accompanied by a growing literature on the role of theory itself in public law.112 
In claiming that this theoretical turn is a site of rationalism, we should not be 
taken to suggest that all theorising is the product of a rationalistic propensity, nor 
should we be taken to claim that even if a theory rationalises it is necessarily 
rationalistic. Our claim is instead that this turn to theory encourages public 
lawyers to abstract from and relegate to secondary status the practices of the 
constitution. In making this claim, we deliberately avoid associating the theories of 
any one public lawyer, or any given style of public law thought, with rationalism. 
To repeat Oakeshott’s insight: there is a rationalistic propensity more or less 
displayed by all of us. As we see it, there is a tendency for many public lawyers to 
                                                 
106 See T. Prosser, ‘Journey without Maps?’ [1992] Public Law 346. 
107 For Oakeshott, the British parliamentary system ‘was the most civilised and the most effective method 
ever invented’: ‘Contemporary British Politics’ (1947-48) 1 Cambridge Journal 474. On this shared feature of 
the work of Dicey and Oakeshott, see J. Stapleton, ‘Dicey and His Legacy’ (1995) 16 History of Political 
Thought 234, 247-248. 
108 Loughlin, ‘Tinkering with the Constitution’, note 82 above, 539. 
109 Public law is no longer distinguished by an ‘anti-theoretical bias’: C. Harlow, ‘Changing the Mindset: 
The Place of Theory in English Administrative Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 419, 419. See generally P.M.W. 
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110 See, e.g., S. Lakin, ‘Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: the Controlling Factor of Legality 
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111 See, e.g., E. Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
112 See, e.g., P. Cane, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law’ in P.P. Craig and R. Rawlings (eds.), Law and 
Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 3; and M. Loughlin, ‘Theory 
and Values in Public Law: An Interpretation’ [2005] Public Law 48. 
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perform a ‘two step’ that initially divorces theory from practice before using 
theory to measure, critique, and justify the reform of practice. There is a tendency, 
in other words, to conceive of theory as existing independently from and in 
advance of the practices to which it relates; as if, for example, a more reflective 
understanding of ideas such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, 
democracy, and political equality exists wholly separate from understandings of 
longstanding legal and political practice. 
Consider, for example, the claims made on behalf of two important schools of 
constitutional thought: legal and political constitutionalism. The principal claims 
are familiar: for proponents of the political constitution, political processes and 
institutions should be primary in holding those who exercise political power to 
account; for defenders of the legal constitution, judicial review and the common 
law, together with calls for a written constitution, are the true bulwarks against 
abuse of political office. Both legal and political constitutionalists make descriptive 
claims, arguing that a true reading of Britain’s constitutional arrangements reveals 
them to be predominantly legal, not political (or vice versa). Yet, both regularly 
interchange claims of ‘is’ with ‘ought’, blending description and prescription in 
ways that overreach at times and at others conceal those aspects of the 
constitution that do not fit neatly into one or another frame of analysis. For these 
reasons among others, the claims of legal and political constitutionalism are 
sometimes best understood as drawing on select practices of the constitution only 
then to measure, critique, and advocate the reform of inconsistent practices. In so 
doing, the tendency is to acknowledge only selectively the debt of the stylised 
account of the constitution to constitutional practice; at its extremes, the tendency 
is to appeal to abstract ‘republican theory’ or the ‘liberal rule of law’ in a manner 
that denies the debt, as theories, of legal and political constitutionalism to the 
complex and contingent practices both seek to reform—practices not themselves 
susceptible to the order, neatness, and simplifying claims of any one theory of the 
constitution.113 
Here, we see the combination of two mistakes. The first mistake is to lose sight of 
the fact that theorising does not begin with discerning what is implied by an 
abstract idea (for example, about the ‘separation’ of government institutions or 
the ‘independence’ of judges). It begins instead with reflection on characteristics, 
behaviour and patterns that are observed in practice (for example, about the blend 
of coordinated and confused powers and personnel within the institutional 
architecture of government or about the puzzle in which judges always remain a 
part of the governmental apparatus whilst at the same time enjoying a degree of 
independence from other governmental actors). The mistake, then, is the failure 
to recognise that theorising, in Oakeshott’s words, ‘begins with something in 
some degree already understood’.114 A second mistake is to assume that theory 
should inevitably be used to reshape practice. Where a gap exists between theory 
and practice, the impulse of the rationalist lawyer is to reform practice so that it is 
more closely aligned with theory. Rationalistic theorising, in short, appeals to 
                                                 
113 See further G. Gee and G. Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 OJLS 273. 
114 M. Oakeshott, ‘What is Political Theory?’ in What is History and other Essays (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2004) 391, 392. 
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theory as a technique to measure practice and, ultimately, to justify reform, which 
brings us to a third site of rationalism in public law: constitutional reform.  
Rationalistic constitutional reform typically exhibits three characteristics. First, it 
‘rationalises’, by remaking the prevailing legal and political arrangements to cohere 
with reason, order and logic. Second, it ‘formalises’, by converting conventional 
understandings into structured, systematic codes, concordats, and statutory duties, 
together with the standing risk that the codification of practice may come at the 
expense of an understanding of those practices.115 Third, it ‘institutionalises’, by 
incorporating rules, procedures and practices into formal, structured and 
regularised schemes, which sometimes take a very concrete form via the creation 
of new institutions. To be clear, we are not suggesting that all reform is 
rationalistic, or that any given reform is necessarily wholly so. Rather, our 
suggestion is that the recent wave of ‘modernising’ reforms to the constitution 
carries with it a discernible rationalistic propensity as seen not only in the practices 
that are felt to be in need of rationalisation, formalisation and institutionalisation, 
but also in the justifications offered in support of the decision to reform in such a 
way. For at the heart of rationalistic reform lies the vindication of constitutional 
principle. The result of combining these three characteristics with the pursuit of 
principle is to reduce reform to a rationalist exercise in manufacturing technical 
knowledge. 
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 reflects many aspects of rationalistic reform. 
It rationalises the historic office of Lord Chancellor by removing its legislative and 
judicial roles and significantly curtailing its involvement in judicial selection. At the 
same time, it formalises the office’s special responsibility for safeguarding judicial 
independence via a new statutory duty.116 It also institutionalises the constitutional 
position of Britain’s most senior judges by creating a new Supreme Court. Above 
all, the rationales underlying the reforms resound with rationalism, insofar as they 
purport to align practice with principle. It was generally accepted that the Lord 
Chancellor had not, for much of twentieth century, abused the overlapping roles 
or disregarded his duty to defend judicial independence. It was instead understood 
that these overlapping functions within a single historic office facilitated the good 
workings of the constitution by acting as a conduit that nurtured an understanding 
within and between the different actors.117 However, despite this, the principles of 
the separation of powers and judicial independence were cited to justify reforming 
the role of Lord Chancellor,118 even though the workings of the constitution were 
not widely impugned, and even if one consequence was that ministers and judges 
                                                 
115 Consider how the Cabinet Secretary stated in the preface to the Cabinet Manuel (1st edn, Cabinet 
Office, 2011) that the Manual is to be read as a record of ‘rules and practices, but is not intended to be the 
source of any rule’ (iv). That prescription may not hold for long. 
116 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 3. 
117 See generally R. Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The View from the Lord Chancellor’s Office (Oxford: 
OUP, 1993); and D. Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor (Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
118 See Department of Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: Reforming the Office of Lord Chancellor, CP 
13/03 (September 2003); and Constitutional Reform: a New Way of Appointing Judges, CP 10/03 (July 2003) 
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would be less informed of the constraints under which the other acts.119 Similarly, 
it was widely accepted that the location of the highest court within Parliament did 
not undermine the independence or impartiality of Britain’s top judges. It was also 
accepted that the working of the constitution had, by the close of the twentieth 
century, and then for the most part, successfully channelled the Law Lords away 
from the general business of the House and, in turn, other peers away from the 
judicial business of the appellate committee. Yet, despite this, the case for a UK 
Supreme Court was justified as a vindication of principle.120 The separation of 
powers and judicial independence were again used to identify an end to be 
pursued—here, the formal relocation of the top court away from the Palace of 
Westminster to the other side of Parliament Square. Vindication of principle, in 
other words, seemed to be taken as sufficient reason to reform. Critically, most of 
the references to ‘the separation of powers’ or ‘judicial independence’ displayed 
little or no debt to the prevailing traditions of a constitution that, in practice, had 
enjoyed considerable success in realising the independence of its judges.  
For sure, there were other dynamics driving these reforms beyond the vindication 
of principle, such as concerns about the compatibility of the then existing 
arrangements with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
concern about Article 6 hints, however, at another aspect of rationalism: namely, a 
tendency to prioritise the universal (i.e. abstract notions of the separation of 
powers and due process) over the local (i.e. the overlapping functions and 
personnel that has traditionally distinguished the Westminster model of 
government). As others have noted, many of the recent reforms to the 
constitution could be read as an attempt to ‘Europeanise’ Britain’s political 
system, with reliance on formal, universal legal rules and procedures that pay 
insufficient attention to the unique blends of social, political and historical context 
in local constitutions a feature of this phenomenon of ‘Europeanisation’.121 In this 
context, Oakeshott’s lament that ‘what went away as the concrete rights of an 
Englishman have returned home as the abstract Rights of Man’ has special 
resonance; he would add that ‘they have returned to confound our politics and to 
corrupt our minds’.122 
It might be argued that the Constitutional Reform Act is best read as an extension 
of the principles of the separation of powers and of judicial independence that 
were already implicit in Britain’s constitutional traditions, rather than as an 
                                                 
119 On this last point, see D. Oliver, ‘Constitutionalism and the Abolition of the Office of Lord Chancellor’ 
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unnecessary rationalisation of abstract principles insufficiently attentive to those 
traditions. To put this in more Oakeshottian terms, the reformers could perhaps 
be said to have pursued what was intimated in constitutional traditions of 
behaviour that had, for a long time, if in a rather eccentric fashion, demarcated 
and defended the independence of the judiciary and some distinctively British 
understanding of the separation of powers. The reforms might therefore be said 
to have begun with a sound understanding of, and in turn sought to secure change 
consistent with, an existing tradition of behaviour. We concede that this is a 
possible reading of the Act. Our reading, however, is that the motivation for the 
reforms was more rationalistic than this recognises. For when responding to a gap 
between principle and practice, the reformers seemed to assume that the 
principles must necessarily be more coherent than the practices; as if the technical 
knowledge expressed in the abstract principles of the separation of powers and 
the independence of the judiciary could take the place of the practical knowledge 
of the activities to which they relate. The reformers seemed to neglect, in part (not 
in whole), Oakeshott’s insight that principle is an abridgement of practice.   
These are not the only sites of rationalism in public law, and nor are the reforms 
instituted by the Constitutional Reform Act the only examples that resonate with 
the rationalistic propensity. But these three sites of rationalism in public law are 
prevalent and, in important respects, reinforcing. Plainly, the pedagogy of public 
law influences how public lawyers think about and employ theory and approaches 
to theory influence how public lawyers evaluate whether and how to reform. The 
cycle continues as more rationalistic approaches to reform inform the prominence 
given to principles in the pedagogy of public law, and so forth. The golden thread 
is that each site of rationalism in public law reinforces all of the others insofar as 
each prioritises principle over practice—or, as Oakeshott would put it, technical 
knowledge over practical knowledge —without at the same time emphasising how 
the former is an abridgement and summary of the latter. Each site conspires, in 
other words, to reverse the relationship of principle to practice, by elevating the 
former above the latter. This helps explain the progressive nature of rationalism: 
the rationalistic propensity in public law becomes more intense and all-embracing 
over time as the rationalist lawyer becomes less and less adept at using practical 
knowledge when teaching, theorising, and reforming. Without acknowledging the 
debt that principle owes practice, and by supposing that knowledge of only some 
of the constitution is sufficient for knowledge of all of it, the progressive character 
of rationalism culminates in what we term a placeholder constitution. 
VI.  POLITICAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC LAW 
By ‘placeholder constitution’, we have in mind an account of the constitution that 
is not tethered to any one real world constitution. It trades on a universal idea of 
‘constitutionalism’ and the political and legal principles implied by it, as if there is 
one idea of the constitution that is the same everywhere. Rationalism in public law 
treats constitutions as all deriving from one principled constitution, with the task 
of public lawyers to implement the placeholder constitution by redesigning real 
world constitutions in its image. In short, the placeholder constitution is reliant on 
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technical knowledge divorced from the practical knowledge required to make 
sense of it.  
By speaking and thinking in abstraction of constitutional activity, the practices and 
relationships that animate what is partially captured by appeals to principle are lost 
from view. It becomes possible to speak and think about constitutional principle 
without working out what claim is being made out, why it is being made, and on 
the basis of which assumptions. The placeholder constitution is a ready supply of 
words, where those words are summarised to the point of telling us nothing of 
any real value. Equipped with ready phrases—‘the rule of law’, ‘the separation of 
powers’, ‘accountability’—rationalism in public law remains unsure how to act. 
For being constructed with independently premeditated principles the meaning of 
which is construed separately from the practices to which they relate, the 
placeholder constitution in the end consists of ‘gumming together long strips of 
words which have already been set in order by someone else’.123 Identifying the 
ends that every constitution should serve, the meaning and content of principles 
are posited in advance of and independently from the historically situated 
arrangements of legal and political systems. As a result, appeals to principle are 
employed without full awareness of their meaning, a meaning that can be grasped 
only by attending to the practices and workings at the heart of a real world 
constitution’s traditions of behaviour. The placeholder constitution is not, for that 
reason alone, prevented from giving an air of certainty, order, precision, and even 
dignity as compared to the messy, often perplexing and sometimes sordid 
business of law and politics in real world constitutions.  
Susceptible to the rationalist mindset, public lawyers are liable to lose sight of the 
practical knowledge necessary to evaluate the workings of the constitution and 
how any one principle is realised and realisable within it. In our view, this 
rationalist tendency must be resisted and corrected by a renewed engagement with 
practical knowledge in public law or, put otherwise, by exploring the relationship 
between political education and public law.124 Political education, we suggest, is 
not the pursuit of self-sufficient and self-complete knowledge. It invites reflection 
and study in the traditional practices of the constitution, distinguished by its many 
intangible relationships: the prime minister to the cabinet, cabinet to the 
Commons, the Commons to the Lords, the Queen to them all, the committees to 
their chamber, the opposition to the government, the frontbenches to the 
backbenches, the courts to the Queen-in-Parliament, the secretaries of state to the 
permanent under-secretaries of state, the courts to them both, all of which and 
more may be said to be ‘more easily felt than analysed’.125 It is, of course, possible 
                                                 
123 The phrase is from G. Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’ (1948), wherein he laments the 
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to capture aspects of these relationships via principles, rules and maxims. We can 
suggest, in blunt terms, that the Queen appoints the prime minister and that the 
prime minister advises Her Majesty on the appointment of ministers; we can say 
that government ministers are liable to have their decisions reviewed in court but 
that courts are not empowered to set aside Acts of Parliament. These propositions 
give the appearance of certainty and order and may well be settled enough to 
warrant the appearance. But this should not be taken to deny how they build on 
practical knowledge of the relationships on which they rest and, as a result, are 
best understood by one who is familiar with those relationships and least well 
understood by one who is not. The public lawyer understands these relationships 
best when he ‘starts not with the postulation of formal and universal principles . . . 
but within an inquiry into the mundane practices’ of the constitution at work.126 
Political education in public law seeks to bring to life the truth that the principles, 
rules and maxims of the constitution appear certain and complete only inasmuch 
as they build on and reformulate knowledge which is already there. The study of 
public law should be oriented, in sum, to the practices, manners of activity, and 
traditions of behaviour that give it shape.  
This orientation to public law invites a quality of humility, in at least three ways. 
First, studying the practical workings of the constitution cautions against making 
strong claims that conceal the tentativeness of the constitution and its adaptability 
to change. There are many examples of definitive-sounding claims being advanced 
one year only to be retracted the next. Consider, for example, Graeme Moodie’s 
claim in 1971 that although the Westminster Parliament possessed the right to 
legislate for Northern Ireland, despite the devolution of power to Stormont, this 
‘was unlikely to happen’.127 The very next year the Stormont Parliament was 
abolished. In turn, consider Tom Hickman’s observations in 2005 about what 
could be implied about the nature and content of Britain’s constitution given that, 
two years earlier, the constitution had been ‘formally accorded a government 
department: the Department of Constitutional Affairs’.128 By 2007, the 
department had been refashioned into a Ministry of Justice. 
Second, while it is certainly possible to acquire practical knowledge of the 
constitution without being a member of the governing institutions, we should take 
care to test our understandings and theories against those who know those 
institutions best.129 Many of the workings of the constitution are not visible to 
outsiders and, even where they are, often take the form of the rough and tumble 
of day-to-day politics that ‘offend most of our rational and all of our artistic 
sensibilities’.130 Certain events or actions may acquire special significance within 
the realm of public law scholarship, yet might not hold the same significance 
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within the nitty-gritty of the real world constitution; likewise, certain readily 
observable practices may conceal more important, but unseen and unpublicised 
constitutional traditions. It is telling, for example, that the management of the 
business of the House between government and opposition is carried out ‘behind 
the Speaker’s chair’, without formal minuting and without the public recording of 
Hansard. The attendance of members in the chamber, the order and amount of 
speaking time, the need for and timing of divisions, the pairing of members who 
must be absent from divisions, and so forth are all agreed by the government and 
opposition whips in what, for them, are termed ‘the usual channels’ even if, from 
the perspective of the observer, these ‘channels’ may be unknown or altogether 
unusual. For the observer, government and opposition are in regular 
disagreement, but this public persona is facilitated by the ready agreement of both 
when no one is watching. 
Third, the degree of constitutional change at any point in time should not be 
overstated. Without doubt, some reforms are far-reaching, but, as within all 
traditions of behaviour, constitutional change can be appreciated only against a 
constant of continuity. A rationalistic fixation with reform encourages us to 
exaggerate the re-making of constitutional arrangements even though, at any point 
in time, ‘the new [will be] an insignificant proportion of the whole’.131  
In calling for greater engagement with the practices of the constitution, we do not 
seek to correct the mistake of dismissing practical knowledge by, in turn, denying 
the important place of technical knowledge. Rather, we seek to emphasise how 
the miscellaneous assemblage of practices and relationships that make up Britain’s 
constitution makes ‘little sense unless interpreted in the light of innumerable 
political understandings’, with the result that the practices of the constitution are 
primary and the principles, rules, and maxims of the constitution derivative and 
secondary.132 Consider how he who understands the ‘rule’ that the prime minister 
advises the Queen on the appointment of her ministers can misrepresent the 
relationship of the prime minister to cabinet. He will be tempted to think that the 
prime minister really is primus inter pares and that his choice of ministers is bounded 
only by the maxim that ministers should be appointed from both Houses, and 
primarily from the Commons. But one who appreciates how the appearance of 
certitude is warranted will know that the relationship of the prime minister to the 
cabinet is reciprocal and how, whilst a prime minister makes a minister one at a 
time, many a minister acting together can unmake a prime minister. He will know 
that a prime minister leads his cabinet—as he leads Commons and country—only 
where they will go and how a prime minister’s authority is not of his making. The 
student of the constitution’s traditions of behaviour will know, also, that a prime 
minister’s choice in his ministry is ‘far less than it seems to be when . . . looked at 
from a distance’.133  
To see this, the public lawyer appeals to the relationship of the prime minister and 
his cabinet to Commons and party and public and knows that one misunderstands 
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the constitution when one attends to part of it only. He knows, also, of the 
welcome advantages of ambiguity, illustrated by the need to feel one’s way 
through the confidence of the chamber and the grounds for the resignation of 
ministers.134 In this, he knows that the strength of the constitution may lie in part 
in what the Rationalist would identify as ambiguity in need of correction. But that 
ambiguity is not open-ended; it is situated. Practical knowledge of a tradition of 
behaviour is ‘unavoidably knowledge of its detail: to know only the gist is to know 
nothing’ for all of the reasons that technical knowledge can only abridge, and not 
capture the exploration of sympathy within the workings of the British 
constitution.135 
CONCLUSION 
In interrogating the rationalistic tendency within public law, we have sought to 
highlight how rationalism distorts our understandings of Britain’s constitution. 
Drawing on the work and thought of Oakeshott to articulate the importance of a 
public law education acquired in the enjoyment of a tradition, our aim has been to 
situate practical knowledge as an inescapable part of our public law learning. We 
do not argue that Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism is the only pathway into a 
renewed engagement with practical knowledge in the study of the constitution.136 
Nor do we suggest that all public lawyers require intimate practical experience 
with the constitution before contributing to public law thought. Rather, we argue 
that each and all should be sensitive to the place of practical knowledge in shaping 
their understanding of the constitution. It might be argued that society, and by 
extension the constitution, is today too complex and heterogeneous to bear an 
understanding emphasising tradition. If true, it is not altogether clear why the 
simplifying appeal of rationalism would be the alternative; more fundamentally, 
however, the understanding of tradition on which we draw envisages traditions of 
behaviour as uncertain and contested, coherent and incoherent; in short, as a ‘flow 
of sympathy’ diffused between past, present and future. In this way, our invitation 
is to situate our public law education within the concrete practices of the 
constitution. Our hope is that, in doing so, we will be able to do without the 
illusion that in public law, as in politics, ‘the abridgement of a tradition is itself a 
sufficient guide’ to education.137 
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